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BILINGUALISM IN UKRAINE:  
VALUE OR CHALLENGE? 
 
Summary. Several analyses have summarized the linguistic situation of Ukraine, 
highlighting various aspects of the problematic issues of Ukraine’s language policy. The 
fundamental problems of the linguistic situation in Ukraine are the lack of consensus 
regarding the issue of what role the Ukrainian language has in constructing the new post-
Soviet identity and in nation building, what status the Russian language should be given in 
Ukraine. According to the data from the 2001 census, 80% of the adult population 
of Ukraine speak (at least) one other language fluently in addition to their mother tongue. 
In the country it is clear that the reality in most of Ukraine is of bilingualism. Almost 
everyone in Ukraine is bilingual; to varying degrees, a fundamental characteristic of the 
language situation in Ukraine is bilingualism of society. In spite of this, due to negative 
historical experiences, bilingualism is stigmatized in Ukraine, and that makes codification of 
bilingualism impossible on the state level. The paper shows the attitude of the political elite 
that took power after the overthrow of President Viktor Yanukovych towards the issue of 
bilingualism. We present how the linguists and representatives of the intellectuals comment 
on the bilingualism in Ukraine. The primordial, national romantic view that makes the 
Ukrainian language and the (free and independent) Ukrainian nation the same nowadays 
strongly dominates in Ukraine. 
 
Keywords: Ukraine, Ukrainian language, Russian language, language policy, language 
rights. 
 
Introduction 
 
The particular characteristics of the geopolitical and geographical position of 
Ukraine, the variable political, historical, economic, cultural and social 
development of the regions of its territory inherited from the Soviet Union, the 
ethnic and linguistic composition of its population, and the fact that the 
representatives of the titular nations of all neighbouring states are among its 
citizens all turn the issues of language into matters of internal and foreign policy 
as well as of security policy in this country. The military conflict currently 
underway is also indicative of this.  
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Several analyses have summarized the linguistic situation of Ukraine, highlighting 
various aspects of the problematic issues of Ukraine’s language policy 
(Taranenko, 2007; Besters-Dilger, 2009; Csernicskó & Ferenc, 2016). The 
fundamental problems of the linguistic situation of Ukraine are the lack of 
consensus regarding the issue of what role the Ukrainian language has in 
constructing the new post-Soviet identity and in nation building, what status the 
Russian language should be given in Ukraine, and what functions can be assigned 
to other minority languages (Polese, 2011). 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the building of the Ukrainian 
nation was aided by the system of institutions inherited from the USSR (relatively 
clearly marked inner and outer borders, a parliament, ministries, representation 
in the UN, etc.), but at the same time, made difficult by the Russian community 
living in Ukraine, which became a minority overnight (Brubaker, 1996, p. 17). 
The presence of the sizeable Russian community has been felt primarily in the 
Ukrainian–Russian language struggles. Both researchers (Pavlenko, 2008, p. 275; 
Ulasiuk, 2012, p. 47) and the specialists of international organizations 
(Opinion, 2011, p. 7; UN, 2014) have repeatedly pointed out that the question of 
languages is heavily politicized in Ukraine, and the fact that it is not clearly 
settled can lead to the emergence of language ideologies as well as to conflicts of 
ethnic groups and languages. It is no coincidence that the Law on National 
Security1 regards, in Article 6, the settling of the language issue as a priority 
among the country’s national interests. 
According to data from the 2001 census, 80% of the adult population of 
Ukraine speak (at least) one other language fluently in addition to their mother 
tongue (Lozyns’kyi, 2008, p. 254). In the country it is clear that “the reality in 
most of Ukraine is of bilingualism” (Bowring, 2014, p. 70). “Almost everyone in 
Ukraine is bilingual, to varying degrees” (Bilaniuk, 2010, p. 109). “A fundamental 
characteristic of the language situation in Ukraine is bilingualism of society” 
(Shumlianskyi, 2010, p. 135). In spite of this, due to negative historical 
experiences, bilingualism is stigmatized in Ukraine (Pavlenko, 2011, p. 52). The 
majority of the Ukrainian intelligentsia feel the bilingualism as a yoke 
(Vynnychuk, 2016) that makes codification of bilingualism impossible on the
                                                          
1 Закон України „Про основи національної безпеки України”. Retrieved from: 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/964-15. 
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state level (Csernicskó, 2017). The language law of 2012 which codifies 
bilingualism on a regional level is considered a Troian horse (Marusyk, 2016b). 
Our paper shows the attitude of the political elite that took power after the 
overthrow of President Viktor Yanukovych towards the issue of bilingualism. We 
present how the linguists and representatives of the intellectuals comment on the 
bilingualism in Ukraine. 
 
The Language Issue as a Factor of Political Mobilizing 
 
Ukraine, which gained its independence in 1991, is undergoing the worst crisis of 
its brief history. At the turn of 2013–2014 this crisis outgrew the borders of 
Ukraine. The annexation of the Crimea, the eastern Ukrainian armed conflict 
endangers the balance of the world’s security policy; the political and economic 
sanctions against Russia and the responding opposing sanctions are obstructing 
the growth of world economy. The situation which is defined as the “Ukrainian 
crisis” in the international press is a consequence that is composed by different 
factors. The linguistic division of the country and the Ukrainian–Russian linguistic 
rivalry have also contributed to causing the political, military and economic crisis 
(Csernicskó, 2017). 
The fight between the two dominant ethnic groups broke out because of 
the functions of the Ukrainian and Russian language. As a result, a paradoxical 
situation has risen in the language situation and the judgement of the state 
language policy of the minorities (amongst them the loudest are Russian-
speaking) are dissatisfied with their guaranteed language rights, while the 
majority of the elite is worried about the current status and future of the 
Ukrainian language (Kulyk, 2014; Korostelina, 2013, p. 313). 
The main cause of the language-issue-related demonstrations in recent 
history of Ukraine was the adoption of the new Language Act.2 After being 
defeated in the 2004 Orange Revolution, Yanukovych won the 2010 presidential 
election, the President and the Party of Regions behind him – according to 
election promises – he intended to base language policy on the real situation. 
They wanted to codify the country's de facto bilingualism by raising Russian into a 
                                                          
2 Закон України „Про засади державної мовної політики” Retrieved from: 
http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/5029-17.  
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second state language status. The central part of their argument was that violent 
nationalism threatens linguistic and ethnic rights of the Russian-speaking 
population, it overshadows the Russian language and culture (Bowring, 2014). 
However, the right of free use of the Russian language was not only demanded in 
the southern and eastern regions, but also across the country, also in areas 
where the proportion of the Russian-speaking population is insignificant. The new 
power – ignoring the protest actions – began to rewrite the Constitution and the 
Language Act. They did not have the political power for the amendment of the 
Constitution: they did not get two-thirds of the votes in the Parliament. However, 
the 1989 language law from the Soviet times, has been replaced after scandalous 
and unworthy parliamentary scenes and political games. 
The language law had a number of opponents. The Constitutional Court 
was repeatedly asked to declare it unconstitutional, organizing several protests in 
the streets. The language issue was not reassuring. In spring 2014 it has become 
a casus belli. 
On 21 November 2013, it became apparent that the president of 
Ukraine – a country heading towards state bankruptcy at the time – was not 
going to sign the free trade agreement or the association agreement with the 
European Union in Vilnius. The Ukrainian government opted for a very favourable 
Russian loan rather than the IMF loan, which would have brought unpopular and 
strict austerity measures threatening its power. 
On 23 November protests for Ukraine’s European integration began in 
Kyiv. The protests organized in the city’s main square3 were peaceful for a while 
and were called the Revolution of Dignity. On 30 November an unreasonably 
brutal use of force by the police propelled the lukewarm protests into a national 
movement. The parliamentary majority backing the president modified several 
laws on 16 January 2014, in order to limit people’s right of assembly. This 
triggered the protests to escalate to uncontrolled violence which resulted in many 
casualties as well. The parliament repealed the laws of 16 January on 28 January, 
and Prime Minister Mykola Azarov resigned. On 22 February Yanukovych fled the 
country. 
                                                          
3 Kyiv’s central square is called майдан Незалежності (Independence Square) in Ukrainian. 
The locals usually refer to it as Майдан (Square), and it was called Maidan in news 
broadcasts, which, in turn, gave rise to the most often used name of the movement as 
Euromaidan/Євромайдан. 
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A quick realignment occurred in the parliament. Representing different parties 
than before, the same members of the parliament formed a parliamentary 
majority which repealed the language law on 23 February, 2014.4 Russia 
immediately announced that it would defend the Russian speaking minority of 
Ukraine and protect it from Ukrainian nationalism. On the territory of Crimea, 
which was transferred in 1954 as the Crimean Autonomous Republic from the 
Russian Federation to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, military personnel 
from the Russian army bearing no insignia of their affiliation (called little green 
men in popular discourse) appeared on the same day (Galeotti, 2015). 
Russian President Vladimir Putin said the following in his speech during 
the ceremony regarding the annexation of the Crimea on 18 March 2014: 
 
“… the residents of Crimea and Sevastopol turned to Russia for 
help in defending their rights and lives, in preventing the events 
that were unfolding and are still underway in Kiev, Donetsk, 
Kharkov and other Ukrainian cities. Naturally, we could not leave 
this plea unheeded; we could not abandon Crimea and its 
residents in distress. This would have been betrayal on our part. 
(…) Our concerns are understandable because we are not simply 
close neighbours but, as I have said many times already, we are 
one people. (…) Millions of Russians and Russian-speaking people 
live in Ukraine and will continue to do so. Russia will always 
defend their interests using political, diplomatic and legal means. 
But it should be above all in Ukraine’s own interest to ensure that 
these people’s rights and interests are fully protected. This is the 
guarantee of Ukraine’s state stability and territorial integrity”.5 
 
Two and a half years after the beginning of the events of Donbass and the 
Crimea, Putin stated his opinion that due to steps taken by the Ukrainian power, 
Russia “was forced to defend Russian-speaking population of Donbass”.6 
Temporarily filling the positions of both president and speaker of the 
parliament, Oleksandr Turchynov assessed the situation and decided, on 
27 February, not to sign the document that would have repealed the language 
law of 2012, which thus remained in force. It was too late for a decision, and the 
                                                          
4 Ukraine abolishes law on languages of minorities, including Russian (23-02-2014). 
Retrieved from: 
http://rbth.co.uk/news/2014/02/23/ukraine_abolishes_law_on_languages_of_minorities_inc
luding_russian_34486.html.  
5 See: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603.  
6 See: http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/3756878-putyn-vynudyly-zaschyschat-
russkoiazychnykh-na-donbasse.  
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attempt of the abolition of the 2012 language law become the pretext of the 
newest and most serious crisis in Ukraine. 
The language issue was one of the main causes of the conflict that 
erupted in the eastern part of the country (Osnach, 2015). The attempt of the 
abolition of the language law – when a few hundred meters away from the 
representatives voting on this in parliament, thousands protested, gunmen looked 
at each other eye to eye, burned in fires – demonstrates how important and 
symbolic is the language issue in Ukraine. 
 
The Language Policy Amended in Order to Deal with the Crisis 
 
Instead of suddenly abolishing the language law Turchynov made a proposal to 
develop a new language law.7 He stated that the draft of the new law to be 
completed within a short period of time, “taking into account the existing 
speculations regarding the language issue.” Turchynov also added that the new, 
balanced Language Act “will take into account the eastern and western parts of 
Ukraine, the interests of all ethnic groups and national minorities.” The new 
language law has still not been born, but this step served to ease the tension, as 
the statement that Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Turchynov pledged on 
18 April 2014, that the highly centralized state power will be decentralized and 
Russian will get a special status (Marusyk, 2015).8 The parliament on 20 May 
voted the “Memorandum of Understanding and Peace”, in relation to the 
languages in which it says: 
“In parallel with the status of the Ukrainian language as a state language 
the Supreme Council of Ukraine guarantees the insurance of the status of Russian 
language. The government will also guarantee the support for the languages of 
national minorities in minority areas compactly.”9 
“I hope – Petro Poroshenko said in a statement on 28 June 2014 – that in 
the history of Ukraine the issue of language or culture will never again threaten 
                                                          
7 See: http://iportal.rada.gov.ua/news/Novyny/Povidomlennya/88685.html. 
8 Available online:http://www.slovoidilo.ua/news/2131/2014-04-18/yacenyuk-i-turchinov-
poobecshali-russkij-yazyk-i-decentralizaciyu-vlasti.html.  
9 Постанова Верховної Ради України Про меморандум порозуміння й миру. Retrieved 
from: http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1280-18. 
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the national unity,”10 thereby acknowledging that the unsettled language problem 
is a security risk for the state. 
After the overthrow of the regime of Yanukovych the elite that came to 
power is trying to become a leader in both sides. President Poroshenko in his 
post-election speech and in his New Year's speech made gestures towards the 
Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine. At one point in his speech he switched to 
Russian. He also stated that one can love Ukraine in Russian as much as in 
Ukrainian.11 He added that 62% who fought for Ukraine in the east is Russian-
speaking, and he thinks that the parliamentary decision, which deprived the 
status of Russian as the official language was a mistake, as this language issue 
has become a problem threatening national unity.12 The President was the 
supporter of a movement, which tried to reduce the tension in the country: the 
“Єдина країна – Единая страна” (single or integrated country) slogan (Ukrainian 
and Russian) was depicted on posters, billboards, leaflets, on national television, 
in the corner of video clips; it also has a dedicated page on the most popular 
Russian social network site.13 
The President and the Prime Minister saw a direct link between the 
language issue and the country's already critical situation, and attempted to 
relieve the tension. However, this came too late. In April 2014 the recent 
domestic political developments overshadowed the case of the new language law. 
With the support of the Russian army an armed conflict broke out in East-
Ukrainian Donetsk and Luhansk counties. The euphemistically called “anti-
terrorist operation” – besides the country's extremely serious economic situation 
and unbalanced domestic politics – led to a severe crisis. 
 
Russian as “The Language of the Enemy”, and the “Aggressor’s 
Language” 
 
The tolerant language policy of the new Ukrainian power gives reason for 
nationalist intellectual circles to keep attacking the president (Osnach, 2015; 
                                                          
10 Available online: http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/3385352-reshenye-o-
lyshenyy-russkoho-yazyka-statusa-rehyonalnoho-bylo-oshybkoi-Porosenko. 
11 See: http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/08/23/7035607/. 
12 Available online: http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/3385352-reshenye-o-
lyshenyy-russkoho-yazyka-statusa-rehyonalnoho-bylo-oshybkoi-Porosenko.  
13 See: https://vk.com/edina_ukr.  
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Shevchuk & Oliynyk, 2015). Such attacks have a long tradition in Ukraine. Many 
politicians and intellectuals of national leanings talking about two Ukraines, 
regarding half of the country to be Ukrainian in its language and ways, and the 
other half to be “creole” (Riabchouk, 2003). People in the latter were perceived as 
Russified Ukrainians who “had to be reconverted” to the Ukrainian language and 
nation. According to Bilaniuk (2010, pp. 116–117), it is as if many people in 
Ukraine would see a necessary connection between the ethnic and linguistic 
identity: ethnic Ukrainians must speak Ukrainian, Russians must speak Russian. 
According to this logic, the Russian-speaking Ukrainians are the proof of the 
existence of Russian imperialism, and steps should be taken in order to prevent 
the fall of the Ukrainian state and language (Bilaniuk, 2010, p. 117; Pavlenko, 
2011, pp. 48–49). 
Those who thought along these lines often categorized the population of 
the country into moral groups on an ethno-linguistic basis (Masenko, 2007, 
p. 57). Many considered people of Ukrainian ethnicity but of Russian mother 
tongue to be traitors or “janissary” (Kulyk, 2001, p. 211; Pavlenko, 2011, pp. 48–
49). The language exchange of the Russian-speaking Ukrainians is considered a 
moral offense (Shumlianskyi, 2010, p. 142). Hnatkevych (1999, p. 11) accuses 
those who speak to their children in Russian at home of the “degeneration of the 
Ukrainian nation”, who are “infected” by the Russification as a “disease” and are 
not looking for a “cure”. Due to the “deformed” language situation (Masenko, 
2007, p. 7), a part of the political and social elite regarded as the primary 
language policy task of the state the strongest and widest propagation of the 
Ukrainian language (Matsyuk, 2009, p. 178). 
The central idea of this attitude was that the shared Ukrainian language 
was a special symbol of the newly formed and unified political nation and 
“a means of strengthening the state’s unity” (Concept, 2010). Thus, according to 
nationally inclined politicians, all those arguing for two state languages or 
believing that minority languages would be given official status are acting against 
the idea of a new Ukrainian state and a unified Ukrainian nation and state 
(Mayboroda & Panchuk, 2008, pp. 207–209). They considered it all too natural 
that the Ukrainian people who gained state independence wanted to have 
Ukrainian monolingualism after a historically long period of forced and 
asymmetrical bilingualism (Shemshuchenko & Horbatenko, 2008, p. 168). Those 
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who regarded the linguistic state of the country as postcolonial (Masenko, 2004) 
were of the opinion that the struggle against the Russian language, forced on 
Soviet Ukraine as a language of “communication between nations”, was a 
necessary part of the independence of the nation and the language as well as of 
Ukrainian self-consciousness. Yushchenko (2010) proclaimed that “the nation 
gains immunity against adversary influences from the outside only through 
forming a unified linguistic and cultural space”. 
Not surprisingly, the conciliatory language policy has been the subject of 
criticism after the new revolution. One of the best known Kyiv based linguistis, 
Larysa Masenko stated the following in an internet portal where language related 
issues are discussed regularly: 
 
 “The currently popular slogan »Єдина країна – Единая страна« 
is faulty: it solidifies bilingualism on a country level, that is, it 
strengthens Russian as a second state language. In other words, 
it does not unify the country but divides it. By saying Единая 
страна in Russian we turn to those living in the east and assert 
that Ukrainian, which is a special symbol of the unification of the 
nation, is not obligatory, even for the president, and with this we 
betray Ukrainians, primarily those living in the east, who are loyal 
to their language despite the constant pressure from the Russian 
speaking environment” (Masenko & Orel, 2014). 
 
Yuri Shevchuk, a linguist teaching Ukrainian in the United States agrees: “The 
Ukrainian society has not only become a hostage to the ‘united and indivisible’ 
Russia's imperial formula ‘Єдина країна, Единая страна’ which confirms the 
Russification. With its resignation and conformism they take part in destroying 
their own language and culture” (Shevchuk, 2015). 
Shevchuk also questions whether Russian speakers could be good 
patriots, “The hybrid war in the east broke out in the battleground of the culture 
and civilization as well. Previously, it was quite obvious who is a supporter of 
Ukrainians and who is an enemy in terms of language and culture. Now, however, 
the ‘new’ patriots’ surprising idea appeared who love Ukraine, but do not love the 
Ukrainian language. This concept is doubtful to me” (Shevchuk & Vlasiuk, 2015). 
Citing a metaphorical parallel between the inhabitants of Gilead and 
Ephraim of the biblical Book of Judges (112, p. 56), known for bloody conflicts 
(see now Shibboleth/Sibboleth) and between the Ukrainian war, Shevchuk 
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opposed the Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism for all kinds of manifestations: 
“The linguistic schizophrenia deprives the protective role from the Ukrainian 
language in the existential situations when your life is in danger, and based on 
your language you can distinguish ours from the enemy” (Shevchuk & Palazhyi, 
2015). 
He believes that those who propagandize bilingualism use Ukrainian as a 
decorative mask in linguistically schizophrenic situations, and in fact seek a 
Russian-speaking monolingualism: 
 
“The Ukrainian language is necessary for the russification 
programs only because they can hide behind it. If they withdrew 
Ukrainian and kept only Russian, then everyone would understand 
that we are exposed to russification, and if we have some 
Ukrainian sprinkled on top, we get a situation in which is needed 
in the field of cultural hybrid war: one cannot know who is the 
enemy and who is a friend, who undermines the Ukrainian 
identity, and who is supporting” (Shevchuk & Palazhyi, 2015). 
 
So there are opinions according to which the new political elite continues the 
policy of russification of the earlier eras, but now under a patriotic camouflage. 
The Chairman of the national coordination council in defence of the Ukrainian 
languages saw this situation like this in the summer of 2015: 
 
“Changing the russification of ‘doves’ and ‘hawks’ of the Russian 
Empire and the Soviet Union a post-revolutionary period occurs, 
the ‘patriotic russification’. Now under the noble slogan ‘single 
country’ the ‘standardization’ of the linguistic space continues in 
such a way that the Ukrainian language is not to ‘chase rights’ of 
the Russian-speaking patriots” (Marusyk, 2015). 
 
Masenko (2015) is suspiciously eyeing the Russian-speaking part of the Ukrainian 
society: “The victory in the linguistic and cultural war with Ukraine was a 
prerequisite for Russia in the current military intervention, and the occupation of 
Donbass and the Crimea. And planning the revitalization of the Soviet empire, the 
Kremlin is counting on those parts of the Ukrainian population which could be 
‘crystallized’ by the control of the mass media.” 
According Marusyk (2016a), “The process of decommunization which is 
still ongoing, cannot be completely successful without starting the process of 
decolonization and derussification”. 
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Many consider that the sacrifice made by Russian native speakers on the front 
line for Ukraine is not enough. A Ukrainian writer explains in one of the entries in 
a language policy portal on Russian-speaking people fighting against separatists: 
“Somehow we should make them believe, that their Moscow language is their 
personal sin against Ukraine [...]; against the Ukraine, for which, literally, they 
shed their blood” (Matsyuk, 2015). According to him, the Russian-speaking 
Ukrainians also have to be convinced that the Russian language in Ukraine is not 
worth the blood sacrifice. And then he asks the question: “When will they [the 
Russian-speaking Ukrainians] leave the Russian speech which has only been their 
mother tongue since the second generation? This will be the redemption of their 
original sin, which is more expensive for Ukraine than their blood” (Matsyuk, 
2015). 
In the next article the same writer states that the Russian-speaking 
Ukrainian citizens want to continue their privilege inherited from the Soviet era 
and not taking up arms for the country, “they fight for the liberal Ukraine for their 
own children, who will reign in the Ukrainian-speaking plebs. [...] The Russian-
speaking volunteers should finally realize their sins of their Russian speech” 
(Matsyuk, 2016). 
The battlefield sacrifice of the Russian-speaking is being reduced by 
sociological research. For example, a survey published 6 June 2016, points out 
that among the participants of the ATO 73% are of Ukrainian mother tongue, 
6% of Russian and 19% of the Ukrainian-Russian-speaking rate; however, among 
those informants who are not involved in the ATO, the proportion of native 
speakers of Ukrainian is only 55%; however, 19% are Russian-speaking and 23% 
are bilingual. So there is a bigger proportion of the Ukrainian-speakers in the ATO 
than amongst those who are not involved in the fights. 
Civil movements are protesting against the missing Ukrainian 
nationalization. On the 9 November 2015 (the Ukrainian language and literacy 
day) a movement in front of the presidential office announced claims to provide 
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special status of the Ukrainian language, the motto was “Ukrainization – 
resistance against the occupation.”14 
 
“The [...] language law was written on Putin’s knee, and had a 
different purpose. The president keeps talking about the 
protection of the Ukrainian language, but nothing happens. We 
are tired of demagoguery. A war is going on here, the Russian 
propaganda pours from the screen, and no one does anything 
about it” – said one of the protesters.15 
 
Every year on 9 November the Ukrainian Literacy Day is celebrated. On this 
occasion a one and a half minute video was made where volunteers in eastern 
Ukraine who took part in battles, tell their ideas on Ukrainian politics.16 The words 
of the volunteers indicate, how the Ukrainian national side sees the role of the 
Ukrainian and Russian languages, objectives and tasks of the wartime language 
policy. The first interviewee, said: “I grew up in a Russian-speaking family. After 
the Maidan I switched to the use of the Ukrainian language, because I realized 
that the best resistance against the Russian aggression is if we speak Ukrainian”. 
The next interviewee, in the uniform of the National Guard, considered 
that as long as we speak the same language with the enemy, they “think we are 
all the same and bring troops again and again to ‘liberate’ us and annex us to 
themselves”. Another volunteer, wearing a uniform stated: “enemies (...) openly 
claim that where the Russian language is, there is the Russian interest”. People 
appearing on the video claim that “we did our best on the front line, but we may 
lose another war: the fight for our language and nationality”. 
Finally they summarized the essence of the message: “If you do not want 
the Russian soldiers to come and ‘liberate’ you and your loved ones use the most 
powerful weapon against them: speak Ukrainian! Switch to Ukrainian! Demand a 
strong support from the government of the Ukrainian language! Remember: the 
key to peace in the Ukrainian language, Ukrainian language is our safety.” 
The public radio and television council published a press release on 
18 November 2015 where they express a concern that the proportion of the 
                                                          
14 See: http://language-policy.info/2015/11/scho-mozhna-zrobyty-u-den-ukrajinskoji-
pysemnosti-ta-movy/.  
15 See: http://language-policy.info/2015/11/na-bankovij-protestuvaly-proty-rusyfikatsiji/.  
16 See: http://language-policy.info/2015/11/vijskovi-ta-volontery-zaklykayut-spilkuvatysya-
ukrajinskoyu-video/.  
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Ukrainian language programs is declining in the electronic media; then they draw 
a parallel between the expansion of the Russian language and the war: “The 
modern history of Ukraine, unfortunately, is an example that after a language 
invasion a military invasion occurs.” 
According to Masenko (2016a), “the Russian language is the chain that 
bounds Ukraine to the Communist past”. Masenko (2016b) stated that “an 
individual can be bilingual, but a bilingual nation did not exist. The peoples, in 
modern terminology, are united by the nation's own national language and 
distinguishes it from others.” Then he closes the paper: “The Russian-speaking 
patriot who does not want to speak Ukrainian, protects the individual rights to use 
the language, which is the most comfortable to use; although, the Ukrainian-
speaking patriots do not only protect the rights of the individual's own choice of 
language, but also the rights of the entire Ukrainian community for a dignified 
existence as a free nation.” 
Extension of the scope of use of the Ukrainian language, the obstruction 
of the Russian language is considered by many as a split from the colonial past 
Soviet era and means freedom and independence. At the 25th anniversary of the 
Ukrainian independence, scheduled for 24 August, a nationwide campaign of 
young people was announced, the slogan was: “Be truly independent: speak 
Ukrainian!”17 
 
The New Drafts of Language Law 
 
Based on the foregoing, the crisis in Ukraine and the language problems are 
connected by multiple threads. In its brief 25-year history, the country has faced 
various crises. In the domestic political crises, the language issue has been 
constantly present: the political elite used the language issue as a mobilizing 
force for the election mood-enhancing factor to their own use. The language issue 
could become a division factor instead of a cohesion factor for a nation that is 
seeking identity after the collapse of the Soviet system. In the tense political 
situation, the language issue has become a pretext for military intervention; it 
                                                          
17 Available online: http://language-policy.info/2016/08/movomarafon-25-do-richnytsi-
nezalezhnosti-ukrajintsi-perehodytymut-na-ukrajinsku-movu/.  
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has become a casus belli. In the conflict of the increased Russian nationalism and 
the growing Ukrainian nationalism language plays the central role. 
The Ukrainian nationalism sees the Russian language as the aggressor, as 
the enemy's language and the spread of the Ukrainian language is connected to 
the country's independence, winning the war in the east and the independence. 
Simultaneously, however, the imperial nationalism in Russia, apparently for state-
supported shows on the Ukrainian nationalism as a response to the annexation of 
the Crimea and the Ukrainian military intervention. This further strengthens the 
concerns about Ukraine and the Ukrainian language. Therefore, more and more 
strongly demand the ukrainization from the government. As a result, several new 
draft laws were made. 
The draft of the new Education Law18, which was brought in front of the 
Parliament on 19 October 2016, greatly reduces the language of the minorities in 
education, virtually eliminates the non-Ukrainian-language in higher education in 
the country. However, this step shall also cause conflicts. This indicates that the 
15 leaders (Russian, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Jewish, Greek, Moldovan, Romanian, 
Gagauz and Roma) of ethnic minority organizations wrote an open letter to 
President Poroshenko to protest against the bill. 
Four and a half years after the law was accepted – on 17 November 2016, 
based on the petition of 57 parliament representatives, submitted back on 
7 July 2014, the constitutionality of the language law was examined.19 
The concern about the language situation is reflected in the three 
language law drafts, which were submitted in December 2016 and January 2017 
by the representatives of the Ukrainian parliament. The drafts registered as 
No. 555620, 566921  and 567022 grant far less right to use minority languages 
compared to the language law, adopted in 2012 (Tóth & Csernicskó, 2017). 
                                                          
18 Проект Закону України «Про освіту». Retrieved from: 
http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=58639.  
19 See: http://www.ccu.gov.ua/novyna/17-lystopada-konstytuciynyy-sud-ukrayiny-u-formi-
usnogo-sluhannya-rozpochav-rozglyad-spravy.  
20 Проект Закону України «Про мови в Україні» Retrieved from: 
http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=60750.  
21 Проект Закону України «Про функціонування української мови як державної та 
порядок застосування інших мов в Україні». Retrieved from: 
http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=60952.  
22 Проект Закону України «Про державну мову». Retrieved from: 
http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=60953.  
 
István CSERNICSKÓ, Réka MÁTÉ 
 
-28- 
According to Article 1 of the 5669th draft law, political discourse initiated about 
bilingualism is against the law: 
 
“Attempts to introduce official multilingualism at national level 
against the Constitution of Ukraine and the established 
constitutional procedures are actions aimed at inciting ethnic 
hatred, linguistic division of the country, a violation of the 
constitutional order and territorial integrity of Ukraine.” 
 
Conclusions 
 
Language policy issues usually become visible when (nation) states are searching 
for their identity and justification for their existence in political, economic or 
cultural transition periods. In general, these situations may involve varying levels 
of national or international periods of turmoil (war, armed or ideological conflict, 
economic recession, etc.). In Ukraine, the language policy is a form of response 
to political, economic and social crises. 
Ukraine today is a state that has been in a transitional period since the 
proclamation of its independence 25 years ago: it seeks the leaven, which can be 
the basis for a new national identity. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian language policy 
did not contribute to this search and could not come up with valid solutions for 
the crisis. Many people hope to end the current crisis with the victory of romantic 
nationalist tendencies in Ukraine, and above the speakers of the one and only 
language, a single homogeneous nation-state extends its protective wings. There 
is a chance for this to happen. 
In Ukraine, 25 years after the declaration of independence, in the 
majority of public language domains, it is still Russian that prevails, especially in 
the media and the economy, but the use of Ukrainian is not exclusive even in 
public administration. In November 2016, the state of war enhanced national 
cohesion and the loyalty to Ukraine. Just like in the euphoria following the Orange 
Revolution, there is again a chance for a new Ukrainian political state to be born. 
Besides the 25-year independence of the Ukrainian state and the Orange 
Revolution in 2004 – which set patriotic feelings on fire –, also the Revolution of 
Dignity ending in the forced retreat of Yanukovych’s regime as well as the war 
going on since the spring of 2014 in some parts of the country the position of the 
Ukrainian language has been strengthening. Higher proportions of Ukrainian 
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native speakers and thus the expansion of the Ukrainian language use are 
enhanced by the annexation of the mainly Russian-speaking Crimea and the fact 
that Kyiv has lost control over the also primarily Russian-speaking counties of 
Donetsk and Luhansk. Tens of thousands of refugees have left the Crimea and the 
eastern regions of Ukraine inflicted by fights, several of whom have gone abroad. 
With consideration to the war, Poland, the Czech Republic, Greece and Hungary 
have been assisting their linguistic minorities in relocating. Ukraine is therefore 
becoming increasingly more homogeneous from the ethnic and linguistic point-of-
view. The currently bilingual country can become monolingual gradually. 
But if this is associated with the ethnic and linguistic homogeneity, the 
strengthening of the romantic nationalist ideology and placing the nation-state 
unity above all, this new position will cause new conflicts in the globalized 21st 
century which is based on cooperation and transfer of knowledge. 
Recent events suggest that the national romanticism and nationalism will 
prevail and that the new Ukrainian political power will use the current crisis to 
strengthen the Ukrainian dominance. The new intention towards the abolition of 
the Language Act of 2012, as well as the new language law drafts consider a 
model of a monolingual nation-state as its objective. 
It seems that the Ukrainian state leaders do not see the value and 
exploitable resources in the widespread Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism of the 
country. They drew the conclusion from the events of the recent past that 
minority languages threaten the country's security. However, in the 
circumstances of the current serious crisis this policy does not contribute to social 
consolidation, nor reconciliation and does not solve the crisis. 
Susan Gal wrote in her now classic book that for a long time researchers 
believed that the language of people can be identified by their culture and 
nationality. On this basis, it was concluded that the widespread bilingualism is “an 
anomaly and therefore paid attention to it as a problem in its own right. (…) 
Therefore, depending on the ideological commitment nationality of the scholar 
and the political climate of the time, bilingualism in a community could be taken 
as indication of a variety of socio-political problems. It could provide evidence of 
the community's mixed ethnic loyalties and thus of a threat to the ideal of an 
ethnically homogenous nation state” (Gal, 1979, p. 2). This primordial, national 
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romantic view that makes the Ukrainian language and the (free and independent) 
Ukrainian nation the same nowadays strongly dominates in Ukraine. 
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DVIKALBYSTĖ UKRAINOJE: VERTYBĖ AR IŠŠŪKIS? 
 
Santrauka. Lingvistinė Ukrainos situacija aptarta daugelyje tyrimų, kuriuose 
nagrinėjamos įvairios ukrainiečių kalbos politikos problemos. Pagrindinės lingvistinės 
situacijos Ukrainoje problemos yra sutarimo trūkumas dėl to, kokį vaidmenį ukrainiečių 
kalba atlieka kuriant naują posovietinę tapatybę ir tautą, bei kokį statusą reikėtų suteikti 
rusų kalbai. 2001-ųjų surašymo duomenimis, 80 % suaugusiųjų Ukrainoje laisvai kalba 
(bent) dar viena kalba, neskaitant gimtosios. Pastebima, kad šalies realybje vyrauja 
dvikalbystė. Beveik kiekvienas Ukrainos gyventojas yra dvikalbis; įvairiu mastu 
pagrindinis Ukrainos visuomenės bruožas yra dvikalbystė. Nepaisant to, dėl neigiamos 
istorinės patirties, dvikalbystė Ukrainoje stigmatizuojama, todėl jos kodifikacija 
valstybiniu mastu yra neįmanoma. Šiame straipsnyje atskleidžiamas Ukrainos politikų, 
atėjusių į valdžią po prezidento Viktoro Janukovyčiaus nuvertimo, požiūris į dvikalbystės 
problemą. Pristatome kalbininkų ir intelektualų komentarus apie dvikalbystę Ukrainoje. 
Dabar vyrauja pirmapradis, nacionalistinis romantinis požiūris, kuris sutapatina 
ukrainiečių kalbą ir (laisvą ir nepriklausomą) Ukrainos tautą. 
 
Pagrindinės sąvokos: Ukraina, ukrainiečių kalba, rusų kalba, kalbos politika, 
kalbos teisės. 
 
